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IS MENS REA A COMPONENT OF PERCEIVED OFFENSE SERIOUSNESS?*
LESLIE SEBBA**
Since the publication in 1964 of Sellin and Wolf-
gang's The Measurement of Delinquency, much scholar-
ship has been devoted to the topic of seriousness
scales. Some of the studies have emphasized the
validity and reliability of the scales while others
have raised doubts about their methodology and
usefulness.' The present article will address a ques-
tion that has received only sporadic attention in
the related literature; namely, the extent to which
offense descriptions used in evolving a seriousness
scale should take into consideration the mental
attitude of the offender at the time of commission.
Sellin and Wolfgang were concerned with only
the external attributes of the delinquent event.
Thus, a typical offense description employed in
their original study read as follows: "The offender
wounds a person with a gun. The victim lives but
requires hospitalization.",2 No indication was given
of the mental state of the offender at the time he
fired a gun. Was he attempting to murder the
victim? Or merely trying to frighten him? Was he
provoked? Or was it an unintentional act, perhaps
the result of insufficient care on the part of the
offender while cleaning his weapon? Beyond the
knowledge that the act constituted an offense, the
respondent was not enlightened. The state of mind
of the offender appears to have been regarded by
the authors of the study as irrelevant for purposes
* The research on which this article is based was
conducted while the author was a visiting Fellow at the
Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal Law,
University of Pennsylvania. Facilities for its implemen-
tation and constant encouragement were provided by
Marvin E. Wolfgang, Director of the Center, and Terence
Thornberry, former Deputy Director. The author wishes
to thank Mark Keintz for his assistance with the com-
puter programming.
** Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem.
'These studies have been reviewed in Turner, Introduc-
tion to the Reprint Edition, in T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG,
THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENCY (reprint ed. 1978),
and Welford & Wiatrowski, On the Measurement of Delin-
quency, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 175 (1975). A nationwide
replication study-the National Survey of Crime Sever-
ity-is currently being conducted by the University of
Pennsylvania in conjunction with the U.S. Department
of ustice.
T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 1, at app. D.
of the measurement scale. This is confirmed in
their description of the scoring system resulting
from the study.3 The main elements of this system
were the number of victims injured and the nature
of their injuries, the number of victims of forcible
sexual intercourse and various forms of intimida-
tion, the number of premises forcibly entered, the
number of motor vehicles stolen, and the value of
property stolen, damaged, or destroyed. With the
possible exception of the intimidation factor,4 no
weight was attached to the mental attitude of the
offender at the time of the commission of the
offense.
Among subsequent studies, the only one directly
concerned with this issue was that conducted by
Riedel. 5 The Riedel study concluded that "perceiv-
ers assess the seriousness of criminal events in ways
that make unimportant inferences of whether the
offender intended the act," with the implicit con-
sequence that "external aspects of the event, such
as the amount of injury, theft, or damage is all the
respondent needs to make a reliable assessment of
social injury."6
The question raised here is an important one in
view of recent suggestions that seriousness scales
may be relevant not only in the development of
criminal statistics, for which they were designed
initially, but also for the decisionmaking process of
police,7 prosecutors, and the courts.9 According to
this approach, the severity of the sentence would
be determined by the seriousness weighting attrib-
3 Id. at app. F.
' Here the emphasis was mainly on objective factors,
such as the offender's possession of a weapon, but in-
cluded also the use of verbal threats, which are more
clearly indicative of a state of mind.
5 Riedel, Perceived Circumstances, Inferences of Intent and
Judgments of Offense Seriousness, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 201
(1975).6 Id. at 208.
7 Heller & McEwen, Applications of Crime Seriousness
Information in Police Departments, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 241
(1973).
s Roth, Prosecutor Perceptions of Crime Seriousness, 69 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 232 (1978).
9 Wolfgang, Seriousness of Crime and a Policy of Juvenile
Justice, in DELINQUENCY, CRIME & SocIETY 267 (1976);
Wolfgang, Current Trends in Penal Philosophy, 14 ISRAEL L.
REv. 43 (1979).
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uted to the offense. Since, however, the mental
attitude of the offender traditionally has played an
important part in the definition of offenses and, a
fortiori, in their punishment, the omission of any
reference to the mental element in developing
scales could result in a radical departure in penal
philosophy. This development would have to be
justified on ideological grounds. However, insofar
as this policy derives solely from the empirical
finding that the degree of intentionality attributed
to the perpetrator of an offense does not affect the
judgment of its seriousness, it seems essential to
reexamine the validity of this finding.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Apart from the Riedel study to be considered
below, there is very little direct evidence on the
significance of nonphysical aspects of the offense in
the construction of a severity scale. As noted, the
original Sellin-Wolfgang study did not allude to
the mental state of the offender. In a replication
study conducted in New England, Lesieur and
Lehman used a definition of homicide that speci-
fied that the injury was inflicted "intentionally. '" 10
However, there was no attempt to evaluate the
effect of introducing this modification-assumed
by Turner" to have been a "negligible change"-
nor were its implications discussed. In another
study by Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk, 12 140 offense
descriptions were employed, some of which alluded
to the mental element. While the study did not
focus on this aspect, the table of mean scores shows
that "planned killings" of a policeman, a spouse,
or an acquaintance were rated more serious than
were "impulsive killings" of the same types of
victim.1 3 Similarly, a survey conducted on behalf
of the British government found that a majority
(62%) of respondents regarded the premeditated
nature of the offense as a ground for imposing a
more severe sentence.1 4 Finally, a study in which
Ontario magistrates were asked what information
10 Lesieur & Lehman, Remeasuring Delinquency: A Repli-
cation and Critique, 15 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 69, 75 (1975);
see also Gold & Reimer, Changing Patterns of Delinquent
Behavior Among Americans 13 Through 16 Years Old: 1967-
72, 7 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE 483 (1975).
11 See Turner, supra note 1, at xvi-xvii.
12 Rossi, Waite, Bose & Berk, The Seriousness of Crimes:
Normative Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc.
REV. 224 (1974).
'3Id. at 228.
14 Banks, Maloney & Willcock, Public Attitudes to Crime
and the Penal System, 15 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 228, 233
(1975).
relating to the offense most influenced their sen-
tencing decisions concluded that "most magistrates
consider the 'moral quality' of the criminal act to
be more important than the actual harm incurred
by the victim."
Is
Riedel's study was concerned specifically, as its
title indicated, with Perceived Circumstances, Inferences
of Intent, and Judgments of Offense Seriousness. It con-
cluded that the attribution of intent to the actor
did not affect the assessment of seriousness.' 6 It
may be argued both on substantive and methodo-
logical grounds that Riedel's findings do not justify
such a far-reaching conclusion. The "intent" vari-
able, which was defined by Riedel in psychological
rather than in legal terms, was not introduced
directly into his questionnaire as an independent
variable; rather, it was inferred from a variety of
surrounding circumstances relating to either "en-
vironmental constraints" (threat, victim precipita-
tion, reward, alien control) or "personal disposi-
tions" (hostile attitude or subcultural values). Six
offenses each were described in eight different ways,
incorporating all combinations of environmental
constraints and personal dispositions. In addition
to scoring the event, respondents were asked to
specify the importance of various factors in leading
the offender to commit the offense. This was done
to determine whether respondents in fact related
to the independent variable. However, the positive
findings in this respect seem to evidence the signif-
icance attributed by respondents to causal factors
rather than to inferences of intent.
The "environmental constraints" and "personal
dispositions" incorporated into the defense descrip-
tions introduced a number of diffuse legal concepts.
Reward, hostile attitude, and subcultural values
normally would be irrelevant to the question of
guilt (unless the hostility verged on the psychotic)
and would affect the exercise of judicial discretion
only at the sentencing stage. Victim precipitation
'
5J. HOGARTH, SENTENCING AS A HUMAN PROCESS 233
(1971). Other studies have suggested that offender and
victim characteristics influence respondents' attitudes.
See, e.g., Turner, supra note 1, at xv (reporting a study by
Nugent & Chansley); Banks, Maloney & Willcock, note
14 supra; Newman, Acts, Actors and Reactions to Deviance, 58
Soc. & Soc. RESEARCH 434 (1974); Rossi, Waite, Bose &
Berk, note 12 supra. T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra
note 1, at 267, on the other hand, found that varying the
age attributed to the offender did not significantly affect
seriousness evaluations. In addition, a recent study has
reached a similar conclusion regarding the social class of
the offender. See Walker, Measuring the Seriousness of Crimes,
18 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 348, 359-60 (1978).
16 Riedel, supra note 5, at 208.
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might, in an extreme case of provocation, reduce a
charge from murder to manslaughter. Alien con-
trol, on the other hand, if it negated the voluntary
character of the act, would be a complete defense
to the charge;' 7 the same is true of threat (the
example specified threat to the life of the of-
fender).' 8 Thus, the last examples, while they un-
doubtedly involved "social injury," strictly speak-
ing, were not concerned with "crime" at all.
It is thus all the more surprising to learn that
the variations Riedel introduced into his case de-
scriptions, differentiating as they did between of-
fenses which would result in heavy penalties and
nonculpable acts, did not affect their perceived
seriousness. This conclusion may be attributed
partly to the criteria employed by Riedel to test
the significance of the variance in his data. In fact,
he found not only considerable variations in the
geometric means for the different versions of the
offenses against the person,19 but also "regression
coefficients.., substantially different from the hy-
pothesized criteria of 1.00.,,2o Riedel regarded these
positive findings as neutralized by the correlation
coefficients, most of which approximated to 1.00.21
These coefficients reflected the logarithmic rela-
tionship of the magnitude estimation scores.
However, an indication of a consistent logarithmic
relationshipss between two scales should not be
regarded as the decisive test for evaluating the
effects of variations in the descriptions of individual
items. This is especially true when such a small
number of items is involved.24
17 Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962)(voluntariness requirement for liability not
satisfied by reflex, convulsion, conduct during sleep or
hypnosis, or bodily movement not otherwise a product of
actor's determination or effort).
'8 Cf id. § 2.09 (it may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense that the charged conduct resulted from a threat
to use unlawful force against the defendant).
i9 Riedel, supra note 5, at Table I. There is no indica-
tion, however, that the "crimes" where the perpetrator
may have had a complete legal defense were perceived as
less serious than the others.
' Id. at 206, Table II.
21 Id. at Table Ill. Riedel attributed some of his positive
findings to the small size of his cells, which when "col-
lapsed" tended to eliminate variations in the dependent
variable. By this method, however, variations in the
independent variable also had been eliminated.
22Id. at 202.
2- On the problem of what constitutes consistency in
this context, see Akman, Figlio & Normandeau, Concerning
the Measurement of Delinquency-A Rejoinder and Beyond, 7
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 442, 444 (1967).
24 This point may be illustrated by some hypothetical
findings. Suppose four offenses are presented, each in an
Finally, one further aspect of Riedel's question-
naire may have contributed to the limited variance
in his results. Riedel clearly differentiated between
the event to be scored and the surrounding circum-
stances, but in the "Rating of Seriousness" sections
of the questionnaires only the event itself was
specified.25 It is possible that some respondents
were at this point scoring the event in isolation of
the surrounding circumstances. This would, of
course, tend to eliminate variance among re-
sponses.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The study to be described here was designed to
reexamine the relevance of the mental element to
the perceived seriousness of offenses. Unlike the
Riedel study, which was concerned more broadly
with different types of circumstances surrounding
the offense, the present study emphasized the legal
components of the offense itself, differentiating not
only between the mental and the physical elements,
but also between the various gradations of mental
element.
The criminal law takes cognizance of four levels
of mental state that may accompany the perform-
ance of a prohibited act. Under the common law,
criminal responsibility will be imposed only if the
actor knows that his conduct may inflict the pro-
hibited harm. Such foreknowledge may take one
of two forms. The more serious form consists of an
intent to inflict that harm; 26 the less serious is an
"intentional" and an "unintentional" version. The mean
scores obtained are as follows:
Unintentional Intentional
Version Version
Offense A 1.0 1000.0
Offense B 2.0 2000.0
Offense C 3.0 3000.0
Offense D 4.0 4000.0
The correlation coefficient between the two versions
across offenses is 1.0, but it hardly can be inferred that
intentionality does not affect responses. This coefficient
may be an appropriate criterion when comparing the
responses of different populations to the same offense
definitions (for which indeed it was proposed), especially
if no modulus is provided. Allowance thereby will be
made for the fact that the respondents may be employing
different ranges. It is inappropriate when the respondents
are derived from the same population and the variable is
the offense definition, as in the instant case. (The corre-
lation coefficient might be an appropriate criterion here
if the mean scores for the two versions were placed in
either column on a random basis.)
25 See M. Riedel, The Perception of Crime: A Study of
the Wolfgang-Sellin Index (1972) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation).
2'The Model Penal Code prefers the term "pur-
[Vol. 71
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attitude of recklessness or indifference to whether
the harm is inflicted. While either form of fore-
knowledge is usually sufficient to give rise to crim-
inal responsibility, there are instances in which
proof of intent is required, especially where one of
the elements of the offense is that the act has been
performed to achieve a particular result.
The third level of mental state is negligence,
which describes the situation in which the actor
did not foresee the consequence of his conduct, but,
as a reasonable man, should have.28 There has been
extensive discussion of whether negligence is
properly subsumed under the term mens ream and,
more especially, of the desirability of punishing
negligent conduct.30 However, there is no doubt
that criminal responsibility will be imposed in some
cases upon proof of negligence,3 ' but the offense
committed in such cases frequently will be less
grave than if the same act had been committed
knowingly.
The fourth level of mental state is in fact a total
absence of any such element, where the law imposes
"strict" or "absolute" liability-as it does in an
increasing number of technical offenses, e.g., traffic
violations. Since such responsibility is not imposed
for more traditional crimes, this level was not
posely." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Of-
ficial Draft 1962). Where the conduct in question is not
undertaken specifically for the purpose of causing the
harmful consequence, but the perpetrator is aware that
this consequence will almost certainly follow, the term
"knowingly" is used. This term also connotes a maximal
level of responsibility. Id. § 2.02(5). These terms have
recently been reviewed by England's Law Commission.
GREAT BRITIAN LAw COMM'N, CRIMINAL LAW REPORT ON
THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME (1978).
2 There sometimes are variations, however, in the
meaning of the term "recklessness." See H. HART, PUNISH-
MENT & RESPONSIBILITY 117 (1968); G. WILLIAMS, THE
MENTAL ELEMENT IN CRIME 9-60 (1965). Such offenses
require specific or ulterior intent.
SSome confusion is caused by the fact that negligence
is used in an entirely different objective sense to refer to
the degree to which the offender's conduct deviated from
the standard of the reasonable man. In this respect, the
Model Penal Code specifies that there must be a "gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (d)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
2 H. HART, supra note 27, at 139-40.
" Compare 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50-51
(1881) with Hall, Negligent Behavior Should be Excluded from
Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632 (1963).
31 A typical approach is that found in the Model Penal
Code, which specifies that foreknowledge is required to
give rise to criminal responsibility unless the law specifies
that negligence will be sufficient. MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
considered in this study.
The first and main hypothesis of this study was
that respondents will attribute greater seriousness
to prohibited acts committed with a higher level of
mental element than to the same acts committed
with a lower level of mental element. If this hy-
pothesis is valid, the significance of earlier serious-
ness scales based upon questionnaires that did not
specify the mental state of the actor comes into
question. What level of mental element were re-
spondents attributing to the offender in those stud-
ies? It is assumed that laypersons adopt the well-
known presumption of criminal law that an of-
fender is presumed to intend the natural conse-
quences of his acts. Thus it is hypothesized that
where no mental element is specified, respondents
attribute intentionality to the actors.
Previous studies appear to have assumed that
respondents were concerned with only physical
harm. The present study hypothesized that the
mental element is relevant to the degree of serious-
ness attributed to the criminal act. Since, however,
most earlier studies did not differentiate between
mental and physical elements, it is conceivable
that, if the first two hypotheses are substantiated,
differential scores for different offenses do not re-
flect the seriousness of the perceived actual harm
at all, but rather the perceived seriousness of the
intent or other mental state attributed to the of-
fenders. This would be the case if the evaluation of
offense seriousness was in fact a reflection of the
moral blameworthiness of the perpetrator. A mem-
ber of the Finnish Penal Law Committee has rec-
ommended. "[T]he punishment should be in
a direct proportion to the offender's degree of
intent or recklessness at the, time of the offense.
Later consequences should not affect the punish-
ment.
3 2
Yet it is indisputable that the degree of harm
actually inflicted, whether or not foreseen by the
offender, traditionally has played a significant role
in the criminal law, a and it seems probable that
2 Trnudd, Crime Statistics Based on Damage: Experience
and Plans in Scandinavia, in OFFENCE CLASSIFICATION &
RATING 107 (1977). See also Schulhofer, Harm and Punish-
ment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the
Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974).
33 Where, however, criminal liability is predicated on
the intentionality of the harm inflicted, the harm in-
tended must have been of the same kind as that which
actually resulted. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962). This does not apply, of course,
where the prohibition is on negligently giving rise to the
infliction of a particular type of harm, but the penalties
in such cases are relatively low. See Fisher, Criminal Lia-
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public attitudes, to some degree, would reflect such
"objective" concepts of seriousness.H Therefore, it
will be hypothesized that, in addition to the signif-
icance of the mental element, the seriousness of the
physical act constitutes an independent component
in the judgment of offense seriousness.
METHOD
Eighty items were included in the experiment.
They can be classified conveniently in four groups
(apart from "controls"). The first group was de-
signed to measure the effects of different mental
elements and, thereby, to test the first hypothesis.
Six offenses were selected, some of which approxi-
mated to offenses included in the original Sellin-
Wolfgang study. The mental state of the offender
at the time of the offense was described in up to
four different ways, corresponding to the four levels
of mental state. The most serious form was where
the offender not only acted intentionally, but at-
tempted to cause a more serious outcome than that
actually achieved. An example would be a wound-
ing by shooting where the actual intent was to kill.
The second form was where the object achieved
was what was actually intended. The third form
was where the offender was reckless as to the
consequences of his act, as where the possibility of
injury was foreseen, but not desired. The final form
was where the offender neither intended nor fore-
saw any harm but was negligent. All the items
included in the questionnaire were offenses under
the Pennsylvania Code. Moreover, their designa-
tion as "offenses" clearly indicated to respondents
that the conduct was penalized under the prevail-
ing law.
The questionnaire included four formulations of
the offense, each with a mental element of different
gravity. The offenses used were wounding, homi-
cide, arson, and the sale of adulterated goods.3
Similarly, three formulations for the offenses of
pollution and for driving without insurance were
included. The reason for this lack of uniformity
was that "attempting something worse" when driv-
ing without insurance or polluting was not easy to
illustrate.
To test the second hypothesis, an additional
control formulation was included for all types of
bility of Negligent Conduct in the United States, in LAw IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIAL AND TEcHNOLOGI-
CAL REVOLUTION (1974).
T6rnudd, supra note 32, at 109.
The final questionnaire in fact referred to contami-
nated goods. See note 42 infra.
offenses described wherein no mental state was
specified. These formulations were the closest in
form to the descriptions of offenses in the original
Sellin-Wolfgang study.
The second group of items (designed to test the
third hypothesis) was concerned with different con-
sequences. Here a specific mental state, either in-
tent or recklessness, was attributed to the offender
and a number of formulations of the offense were
presented which, while holding constant this men-
tal state, varied in the seriousness of the conse-
quences of the criminal act. Thus an intent to
wound by stabbing could result in death,36 ampu-
tation of a limb, a mild injury, or even no injury at
all if the intended victim succeeded in avoiding the
blow. Similarly differentiated results from arson,
reckless driving, the sale of adulterated goods, rape,
and misrepresentation of goods were presented. A
number of control formulations were added, de-
scribing different outcomes but not specifying any
particular mental element.
The third and fourth groups of offenses were
designed to investigate, respectively, the relative
seriousness attributed to principals and accessories
to the crime and the perceived seriousness of certain
"new" types of offenses, in particular administra-
tive regulations and white-collar crimes. These as-
pects of the study are of no direct concern in the
context of the present article and will not be re-
ported here.
37
Since a single respondent could not be expected
to relate to eighty items, the questions were divided
into three groups and responses were elicited from
three subsamples of respondents. The selection of
offenses was structured so that where the same
offense was described in four ways, two versions
were included in subsample A and two in subsam-
ple B, each version appearing in discrete halves of
its respective subsample. 38 The allocation and order
36 Under many criminal codes, where death results
from the commission of an unlawful act, the offense is
classified as manslaughter, without the requirement of
foreknowledge on the part of the offender. This "upgrad-
ing" of the offense was not alluded to in the course of the
experiment, however, since one of the objectives was to
determine how far the respondents themselves would
perceive the offense as more serious without definitional
stimuli.
37 The nature of these offense definitions may be rele-
vant, however, to certain methodological considerations
such as the range and variation in the number of items
with which individual respondents were presented.
3 There was an exception caused by the fact that item
23 fell both within the "mental element" and the "con-




THE SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENSES BY MENTAL ELEMENT: LoG MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (WITH GEOMETRIC
MEANS IN PARENTHESES)*
Offense Intended a Worse Result Intended Reckless N4gligent(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Item Item Item Item -
no. X a o. X no. X s no. X s
Homicide 1 2.3326 0.9142 2 2.6106 1.9319 3 2.1519 0.8881 4 2.0567 1.0211
(215.08) (407.94) (141.87) (113.95)
Wounding 6 2.0196 0.9646 7 1.9323 0.6435 8 1.9564 0.6602 9 1.5819 0.6285(104.62) (85.57) (90.45) (38.19)
Arson 22 1.9312 0.7727 23 1.7625 0.4895 24 1.6569 0.7595 25 1.1844 0.6810(85.35) (57.88) (45.38) (15.29)
Pollution - - - 41 2.1578 1.2697 42 1.6918 0.7437 43 1.5137 0.6715
(143.81) (49.18) (32.64)
Driving
Uninsured - - - 45 1.1873 1.1111 46 0.7806 0.6625 47 0.4783 0.5939
(15.39) (6.03) (3.01)
Adulterated
Goods 49 1.3578 0.9321 50 1.4848 0.4919 51 1.7002 0.8702 52 1.2700 0.6280
(22.79) (30.54) (50.14) (18.62)
*The n value for each cell was either 37 or 38, depending on the respondent subsample within which it fell.
In two cells, however, there were one and two missing values respectively, while for "driving uninsured" only
33, 34, and 27 responses were recorded for the three offense versions.
of the items were randomized. Subsample C in-
cluded all the control versions to avoid, as far as
possible, the juxtaposition of formulations specify-
ing a mental element with formulations which did
not do so, as a respondent might become aware of
the incompleteness of the information in the second
case. Two control items were included in all three
questionnaires. The questions were clipped to-
gether in booklet form to discourage comparisons
with previous responses.
The booklets were accompanied by directions,
which explained, in the traditional form, that the
respondent was required to scale the offenses in
terms of seriousness, using car theft as a modulus.
No indication was given, either in the written
directions or in the accompanying oral clarifica-
tions, of the particular attributes of the offense
being investigated in this study, such as the mental
element or the unforeseen consequence.
The questionnaire was anonymous, but respon-
dents, all university students, 39 were asked to state
sex, race, age, year of study, and area of speciali-
zation. The main sample consisted of ninety-one
students attending courses in the Sociology De-
partment at Temple University. 0 Of these, twenty-
' On the use of students as respondents in seriousness
scaling studies, see T. SELLIN & M. WOLFOANO, supra note
1, at 249-50.
' A larger number of students was required for exten-
sions of the study not reported here. I would like to offer
my thanks to Professor Stanley Turner for his kind
cooperation in making the appropriate arrangements and
to Professors Buerkle, Gerstle, Rosen, Savitz, and Wilson,
all of whom suffered interruptions to their courses.
nine comprised subsample A, thirty-one subsample
B, and thirty-one subsample C. The questionnaires,
however, had been pretested on a group of students
attending sociology classes at Drexel University.
4
'
Of twenty-two students, eight responded to booklet
A, seven to B, and seven to C. Since only one minor
modification was introduced to the questionnaire
after the pretest,42 it was possible to incorporate the
responses of these students into the analysis. The
results thereby obtained did not differ substantially
from those obtained from the Temple students
alone, but the enlargement of the sample improved
the technical quality of the analysis.
RESULTS
Table I shows the mean log scores43 for the items
formulated to test the effect of the mental element
on the estimation of offense seriousness.
Comparison of the mean scores for the three
"orthodox" forms of mental state (intention, reck-
lessness, and negligence) shows that with only two
exceptions the order of magnitude of the serious-
4' 1 am grateful to Suzanne Fleming for making these
students available.
42 The term "adulterated" was replaced by the term
"contaminated" since one student had required an expla-
nation of the former.
' Geometric means consistently have been employed
in the measurement studies; they have the advantage of
reducing the distortive effect of outlying values. The
analysis was conducted on the logarithmic values, but in
tables 1 and 5 the antilogs have been added in parenthe-





ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON COLUMNS (ii) THROUGH (IV) OF TABLE 1
Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F p
Main Effects 143.720 7 20.531 25.875 4 .001
Type of Offense 118.701 5 23.740 29.919 4 .001
Mental Element 28.249 2 14.124 17.800 4 .001
Two-Way
Interaction 8.572 10 0.857 1.080 .375
Explained 152.872 17 8.992 11.333 4 .001
Residual 507.036 639 .793
Total 659.908 656 1.006
ness scores was in the hypothesized direction, i.e.,
intended was greater than reckless, which was
greater than negligent. The exceptions relate to
wounding and sale of adulterated goods, for which
recklessness scored somewhat higher than inten-
tion. For the four items for which an "intended a
worse result" formulation was included, in two
cases, wounding and arson, this item was rated the
most serious. For homicide it was rated second, and
for sale of adulterated goods, it was rated only the
third most serious. Generally speaking, however,
there appeared to be meaningful differences in the
expected direction, as reflected most clearly by
comparing columns (ii) and (iv) of table 1.
To test the significance of the differences, an
analysis of variance was conducted. This analysis
must be treated with a degree of caution since the
assumption of independence was not met fully, the
same respondents having scored more than one
item. The results of the analysis, limited to columns
(ii) through (iv) of table 1 and taking account of
the interaction effects," are shown in table 2.
The effect of the mental element is significant
4 5
at the 0.1% level. When column (i) of table 1 was
included in the analysis, which was then limited to
4 This could not be done if column (i) were included,
in view of the missing items.
45 The correlation coefficients, adopted in earlier stud-
ies as an indication of the similarity of slopes, calculated
on the Temple sample, were as follows: .80 (columns (ii)
and (iii)); .96 (columns (iii) and (iv)); and .91 (columns
(ii) and (iv)). The deviations from 1.00 are of somewhat
greater magnitude here than in Riedel's study, but, in
any case, it has been argued above that this test is
inappropriate as a measure of the effects of variations in
offense formulations in the present context.
main effects only,46 the F value for the mental
element was again significant. 7
In view of the level of significance produced by
the data (P = <.001), it seemed doubtful that the
lack of independence of the data could have af-
fected the results of the analysis substantially.
Moreover, approximate critical values were com-
puted by the Statistics Department of the Hebrew
University 48 to take the effect of the lack of inde-
pendence into account, and the significance level
of the hypothesis of the equality of means was
again substantially less than 1%. Finally, t tests
applied to the means for the "intended" and "neg-
ligent" versions of each offense showed these means
to differ significantly for each of the six offenses.
4 9
This result is demonstrated in table 3.
In the original study by Sellin and Wolfgang,S°
as well as in many of the replications, the scores of
individual respondents were standardized so that
all raters had a similar mean and variance for the
items they scored.Si This was done to neutralize the
effect of differences in the ranges of the scores that
46 In table 2, however, the interaction effect was shown
not to be significant.
47 s.s. = 29.766; d.f. = 3; F = 12.419; p <.001.
48 These computations were performed by Dr. Moshe
Pollak and Professor Gad Nathan.
'9 The t test employed here was that for nonindepen-
dent samples or "paired means" since the same respon-
dents scored both the "intended" and the "negligent"
versions.
SO T. SELLIN & M. WOLFGANG, supra note 1, at 277-78.
51 The formula employed was Z = (X - X)/a. Scores
were measured in standard deviation units from the
mean. This formula would seem to be more appropriate
when comparing different rating groups that have been
asked to score the same items, rather than in the present




THE SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENSES, INTENDED AND NEGLIGENT VERSIONS: LoG MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS,
AND t TESTS*
Offense Intended Negligent t d.f. p**
Item Item
no. X s no. X s
Homicide 2 2.611 1.932 4 2.057 1.021 2.66 37 <.01
Wounding 7 1.967 0.617 9 1.582 0.628 4.60 35 <.001
Arson 23 1.729 0.450 25 1.184 0.681 5.01 36 <.001
Pollution 41 2.15Q 1.270 43 1.514 0.672 3.78 37 <.001
Driving
Uninsured 45 1.226 1.143 47 0.478 0.594 3.33 26 <.01
Adulterated
Goods 50 1.485 0.492 52 1.270 0.628 2.60 37 <.01
*The t test employed here is that used for "paired means." Consequently, the log
means for certain items in this table deviate slightly from the corresponding means in
Table I; for if a value was missing for one version, that respondent was omitted from
the analysis in respect of the other version also.
**A one-tailed test of significance was used here.
different individuals might employ. When this
method was employed in the present study,52 the
picture that emerged was not substantially differ-
ent from that presented in table 1, except in rela-
tion to the relative magnitude of the first three
versions of the offense of wounding, where the
differences were small. The F value of the "mental
element effect" was again significant at the 0.1%
level. Thus, the first hypothesis, that the level of
the mental element affects seriousness scores, was
confirmed.
To test the second hypothesis, that where no
mental element was specified in the offense for-
mulation respondents would attribute intentional-
ity, the mean scores for the "intended" versions of
the offenses appearing in table 1 were compared
with the mean scores for the control versions of the
same offenses in which no mental element was
specified. The t test for independent samples3 was
applied to each pair of means. The results are
shown in table 4.
For five out of six offenses there was no signifi-
cant difference between the means for the "in-
tended" and the "control" versions respectively,
the exception being the offense of pollution. This
finding lends some support to the hypothesis. How-
ever, a comparison of the mean scores for the
,5 The standardization was based upon all the items
which were scored by the respondent, not just those
included in table 1.
0 As explained earlier, the control versions of the
offense were scored by a different sample of respondents.
control versions and all other versions included in
table 1 indicates that for both pollution and driving
without insurance the mean for the control version
was most similar to the mean for the reckless
version, while for sale of adulterated goods it was
nearer to the negligent version." It seems fair to
conclude that, for traditional "street" crimes, in-
tentionality generally is attributed to the offender,
but not for the more modern "regulatory" offenses.
This is in keeping with legislative policy that tends
not to take cognizance of differentiations in the
mental element in regulatory offenses. The second
hypothesis was thus confirmed only in part. 5
Finally, table 5 shows the mean log scores for the
items concerned with the harmfulness of the out-
come of the offense. The different degrees of harm
are labelled "maximum harm," "medium harm,"
"minimum harm," and "no harm." For the first
six offenses in the table, the mental element was
held constant; intentionality was specified for
5 It was nearer still, however, to the "intended worse"
version. The values obtained for this offense were some-
what inconsistent.
An analysis of variance conducted on table 4 showed
the differences in mean scores between intended and
control versions for all offenses to be significant (s.s. =
4.529; d.f. = 1; F = 5.014; p <.05). However, this can be
attributed to the last three items. Moreover, while two-
way interactions were not significant in this analysis,
when replicated on the standardized scores, the interac-
tion, as well as the main effects, was significant. (Main
effects for mental element: s.s. = 10.680; d.f. = 1; F =
15.745; p < .001; interaction effects: s.s. = 9.008; d.f. =
5; F = 2.656; p < .05.)
TABLE 4
THE SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENSES, INTENDED AND CONTROL VERSIONS: LOG MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t TESTS
Offense Intended Control
Item Item
no. X s no. X s t* d.f. p
Homicide 2 2.611 1.932 5 2.394 1.269 0.58(S) 63.91 > .05
Wounding 7 1.932 0.643 10 1.901 0.524 0.23(P) 73 > .05
Arson 23 1.763 0.489 26 1.859 0.576 -0.78(P) 74 > .05
Pollution 41 2.158 1.270 44 1.680 0.530 2.14(S) 49.50 < .05
Driving
Uninsured 45 1.187 1.111 48 0.750 0.704 1.93(S) 53.59 > .05
Adulterated
Goods 50 1.485 0.492 53 1.344 0.610 1.11(P) 74 > .05
*Where the F value for testing the equality of variance was significant at the
5% level, the separate variance estimate (S) was employed in calculating the value
of t. In other case, the pooled variance estimate (P) was used. However, the t
values were in fact almost identical whichever estimate was used.
wounding and arson, recklessness for dangerous
driving and sale of adulterated goods. The formu-
lations for rape and misrepresentation did not spec-
ify the accompanying mental element, but inten-
tionality clearly was implied. The last three items
in the table relate to control formulations, which,
as in the original Sellin-Wolfgang study, left the
nature of the mental element equivocal.
Comparison of the mean log scores in table 5
indicates a clear and uniform tendency for the
means to decline with the degree of harm inflicted.
Moreover, when the means were calculated for the
standardized scores, the decline in mean scores
with reduction in harm inflicted was again uni-
form.
Analyses of variance performed on the first six
rows in table 5 taken separately, and on the table
as a whole, indicated that the "degree of harm"
effect was significant at the 0.1% level.S6 An anal-
ysis of the first five rows and first three columns
also took interactions into account. It indicated
that "degree of harm" was significant as a "main
effect" at the 0.1% level, while the interaction effect
did not seem to be substantial. 57 Moreover, similar
results were obtained when the same analyses were
56 Here again, the assumptions of analysis of variance
were not met fully. However, in addition to the evidence
presented above for the significance of the effect of the
gravity of the outcome, t tests for paired means were
performed on the maximum harm and minimum harm
versions of the first four offenses in table 5. All four
differences in the means were significant at the 0.5% level
(applying a one-tail test).
57s.s. = 2.596; d.f. = 8; F = 0.534; p = .831.
replicated on the standardized scores.58 It thus may
be concluded that differential perception of seri-
ousness of offenses involving the infliction of vary-
ing degrees of harm does not reflect merely the
differential degree of moral turpitude attributable
to the perpetrators. Rather, it is independent of
such differentiation; even where the degree of
moral turpitude, as indicated by the mental state,
remains constant, the measure of seriousness varies
in accordance with the gravity of the result.
However, even in table 5 there is some evidence
that respondents may be influenced not only by
the seriousness of the outcomes of the offense, but
also by differences in mental element which they
associate with those outcomes. The range of scores
tended to be greater for control versions of the
offense, listed in the bottom three rows of table 5,
than for their counterpart formulations, listed in
the first, third, and fourth rows respectively, where
the mental element was held constant.
Having established that the judgments of seri-
ousness are influenced both by the mental element
accompanying the offense and the degree of harm
inflicted, it is pertinent to ask which of these two
variables is the more important. On the whole,
differences were greater between gradations of out-
come, catalogued in table 5, than between forms
of mental element, recorded in table 1. This is not
a scientific criterion, however, since gradations of
outcome, "maximum harm," "medium harm,"
"minimum harm," and "no harm," are arbitrary.
"8 The interaction effect was somewhat greater here:
s.s. = 5.303; d.f. = 8; F = 1.611; p = .118.
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The difference between "medium harm" and
"minimum harm" in the case of arson cannot be
regarded as equal to the corresponding difference
in the case of, say, dangerous driving. A fortiori,
these gradations cannot be compared with those
concerned with a different parameter, namely, the
forms of mental element.59
Another way to examine this question is to coun-
terpose the mean scores for two items, one in which
the degree of moral turpitude as reflected in the
mental element was high but the outcome rela-
tively trivial and the other where the reverse was
the case. Examples of the former in the present
study are stabbing with intent to wound resulting
in only a mild wound or no wound and attempted
rape. Examples of offenses where the mental ele-
ment was relatively modest but its implementation
resulted in the loss of human life were where
unintentional death resulted from shooting, arson,
dangerous driving, and sale of adulterated goods.
Since the mean scores for the latter group were
higher than those for the former, as demonstrated
in tables 1 and 5, it might be argued that the
gravity of the harm inflicted is shown to be more
important than the wickedness of the intention.
Here again, however, the selection of the items
compared, and their formulation, must be consid-
ered arbitrary.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In view of the critical role played by the mental
element in criminal law and the concomitant dif-
ferentiation between intention, recklessness, negli-
gence, and strict liability as possible bases for crim-
inal responsibility, the question raised here was
why the scales developed to measure the seriousness
of criminality or delinquency have tended to ignore
this dimension.
The empirical investigation reported here tested
three hypotheses and found: (i) that the form of
mental element accompanying the offense, con-
trolling for the degree of harm inflicted, has a
significant effect on the estimation of offense seri-
ousness; (ii) that where no mental element is spec-
ified in an offense definition respondents generally
are attributing intentionality to the perpetrator of
the offense, if it be of a traditional "street-crime"
nature; they may be attributing only recklessness
or negligence where regulatory offenses are con-
59 This problem arises even if one assumes the unidi-
mensionality of the underlying scale, i.e., that gradations
of mental element and harm inflicted can be measured
on the same scale.
cerned (e.g., offenses concerned with protection of
the environment); and (iii) that the degree of harm
inflicted, controlling for the mental element, has a
significant effect on the estimation of offense seri-
ousness.
These findings should be taken into account
when interpreting the results of other measurement
studies. The questionnaires employed in these stud-
ies were measuring simultaneously the seriousness
of both the harm inflicted and the mental state;
the scores obtained thus reflect the combined
weights of both these dimensions. Moreover, the
respective contributions of these two elements to
the resulting scores may not be constant since the
possibility of interaction between the weights con-
tributed by type of mental element and type of
offense cannot be altogether excluded ° and since
where the mental element is not specified in the
offense definition, the mental element attribtited
by respondents may vary by type of offense.6'
There are implications here for the construction
of future questionnaires scaling offense seriousness.
The minimum objective in this respect should be
to control for the mental element by its specifica-
tion in the offense description. This will ensure
greater reliability of the components of the event
to which ratings relate.62 Optimally, different com-
binations of mental element and physical act
would be presented in the questionnaire.
Of greater importance are the implications re-
garding the application of the seriousness scales
derived from the questionnaires. Whenever such a
scale is to be employed, careful consideration must
be given to the relevance of the mental element to
the purpose contemplated. If the purpose of the
scale is to arrive at an accurate measure of the
amount and seriousness of crime committed in a
particular location during a particular period, a
scale which took no account of the mental element
would seem to be deficient for intentionality con-
stitutes an essential element in offense seriousness.
Moreover, if it is sought to apply a seriousness scale
'o However, they were not shown to be significant in
the present study. See table 2 supra.
61 The distortion caused by ignoring this finding may
be limited by the possibility that the nature of the mental
element attributed (intentionality for "street criakes" and
recklessness or negligence for regulatory offenses) may
correspond to the mental element which most frequently
accompanies these offenses.
' A number of the offense formulations incorporated
in the national replication study being conducted by
Wolfgang and his associates specify the mental element.
See note I supra.
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TABLE 5
THE SERIOUSNESS OF OFFENSES BY HARMFULNESS OF OUTCOME: LOG MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (WITH
GEOMETRIC MEANS IN PARENTHESES)*
Offense Naximum Harm Medium Harm Minimum Harm No Harm
Item Item Item Item
no. 3 s no. X a no. x s no. X s
Stabbing
(Intentional) 11 2.1621 0.7085 12 2.1510 0.8366 13 1.8679 0.6532 14 1.7021 0.5930
(145.24) (141.58) (73.77) (50.36)
Arson
(Intentional) 27 2.3195 1.3053 28 2.0054 0.6479 23 1.7625 0.4895 29 1.5606 0.5220
(208.69) (101.25) (57.88) (36.36)
Dangerous
Driving
(Reckless) 33 1.9849 0.7571 34 1.7545 0.7033 35 1.6652 0.6603 36 1.3171 0.7515
(96.58) (56.82) (46.26) (20.75)
Adulterated
Goods (Reckless) 54 2.0564 0.8210 55 1.7157 0.4974 51 1.7002 0.8702
(113.87) (51.96) (50.14)
Rape 21 2.1772 0.7863 20 2.1503 1.1357 19 1.8566 0.6461
(150.38) (141.35) (71.88)
isrepresentation - - 58 1.1525 0.6073 - - 59 0.7983 0.7058
(14.21) (6.28)
Stabbing
(Controls) 15 2.3944 0.9526 16 2.0821 0.5178 17 1.7075 0.5614 18 1.5993 0.5620
(247.97) (120.81) (50.99) (39.75)
Dangerous
Driving (Controls) 37 2.1109 0.6728 38 1.5832 0.5702 39 1.5160 0.6217 40 1.0405 0.6287
(129.09) (38.30) (32.81) (10.98)
Adulterated
Goods (Controls) 56 2.0783 0.6936 57 1.6989 0.5795 53 1.3435 0.6098
(119.76) (49.99) (22.05)
*The n value for each cell was either 37 or 38, depending on the respondent subsample within which it fell.
There were missing values, however, for item 36 (n=36) and 59 (n=32), while for item 19 there were 119 respon-
dents since all subsamples responded to this item.
to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed
by the court, whether in combination with other
variables or as the sole criterion, it is almost incon-
ceivable that the scale, whether intended to reflect
concepts of "just deserts," deterrence, denuncia-
tion, or any other philosophy, would not take the
mental element into account. Determination of
sentence must be based upon a scale that incorpo-
rates variations in the mental element accompa-
nying the offense.63
One further topic requires consideration: the
problem of the weight to be attributed to unfore-
seen harm resulting from the commission of the
offense. While the criminal law traditionally has
inflicted heavier penalties where greater harm is
caused even though such harm was not anticipated,
the classical example being the felony-murder doc-
trine, this approach has been strongly criticized on
grounds of morality and efficacy. In an exhaustive
analysis of the possible justifications for this prac-
tice, Schulhofer concluded that it was retaliatory
6 Alternatively, a scale which held constant the mental
element could be used and allowance made where a
different mental element was present in the instant case,
but this assumes the absence of an interaction between
the form of mental element and the type of offense.
in nature and consistent with none of the more
accepted objectives of punishment, i.e., retribution,
deterrence, and preventive restraint.6 T6rnudd
concluded: "A rational and just criminal code
should in principle mete out punishment according
to the degree of subjective guilt of the offender,
regardless of the eventual and unforeseeable final
outcome of the act."'e
On the other hand, the present study indicates
that the public (at least as represented by student
respondents) in fact attributed seriousness weight-
ing to resulting harm, even where unforeseen.
Thus, if, as recently advocated, punishment is to
be based on "just deserts," the fact that people
perceive the infliction of greater harm, even where
unforeseen, as deserving of heavier punishment
must be taken into consideration. This, of course,
only can be inferred from the present study, which
ostensibly dealt with "offense seriousness" without
directly raising the issue of punishment. Whether
this is relevant to the sentence actually imposed
will depend on the role attributed to public opinion
' Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 1603-07.
6 T6rnudd, Towards Crime Statistics Based on Damages,
in SOME DEVELOPMENTS IN NORDIC CRIMINAL POLICY &
CRIMINOLOGY 36, 39-40 (1975).
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in determining the seriousness of the offense for
sentencing purposes.6
The implications of studies of the measurement
of offense seriousness have become acutely relevant
to contemporary criminal policy in light of the
trend away from rehabilitation toward a more
retributive justice model of sentencing, with its
emphasis on proportionality between the gravity of
the offense and the severity of the sentence.6 7 The
6 See A. VON HiRscH, DOING JusTicE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS 18 (1976). Schulhofer takes the view that
"unless it can be shown that a departure from emphasis
on results would substantially undermine respect for the
law, it would seem that popular attitudes as such should
be ignored, and the approach adopted should be the one
that is considered sound in principle." Schulhofer, supra
note 32, at 1514.
' See D. FOGEL, "... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF..."
(1975); A. VON HIRSCH, note 66 supra; Wolfgang, Current
Trends in Penal Philosophy, note 9 supra.
precise orientation of such a model may take dif-
ferent forms.s In particular, in determining the
gravity of the offense, emphasis may be laid either
on the seriousness of the harm inflicted, following
the ancient concept of "talio," or on the moral
gravity of the act, as reflected in the term "just
desert."' Insofar as this new penal philosophy is to
reflect public attitudes, it seems that both these
concepts have a role to play; for in determining the
seriousness of a criminal offense, respondents relate
to both the mental element which accompanied it
and its harmful consequences.
6 See H. HART, supra note 27, at 233-34.
6 See Bedau, Concessions to Retribution in Punishment, in
JUSTIcE AND PUNISHMENT 51 (1977); Gardiner, The Ren-
aissance of Retribution-An Examination of 'Doing Justice,'
1976 Wis. L. REV. 781.
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